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EXAMINING GLOBAL ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
PHARMACEUTICALS IN THE FACE OF
PATENT PROTECTION RIGHTS:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXAMPLE
Bess-Carolina Dolmo*
The divide between world income and access to life saving
medicines is great. Many poor countries try to implement policies to help
their citizens acquire affordable medicines in order to close the economic
gap. The HIV/AIDS pandemic creates an enormous demand for essential
drugs. Moreover, the alarming HIV/AIDS related death rates in Sub
Saharan Africa offers a compelling reason for urgently meeting the de-
mands of attaining essential drugs. This article focuses on the South Afri-
can example. However, the dilemma is acutely global.
OVERVIEW
The magnitude of the HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa coupled by
the difficulty of obtaining affordable and essential drugs, forced the govern-
ment in 1997 to enact legislation that intended to address this critical public
health crisis. The government enacted Section 15(c) of the South African
Medicines and Medical Devices Regulatory Act (SAMMDRA), authorizing
parallel imports and compulsory licensing with the objective of allowing
easier access to affordable drugs.
PARALLEL IMPORTS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
Parallel importing is a feature of price disparity among different
countries. Countries practice parallel importing when they globally seek
lower priced medicines and permit the drugs' import, rather than restrict
purchases at higher priced versions of the same drugs from local distribu-
tors.' Parallel imports are an effective means for poor and developing
* B.A. University of California at Berkeley; M.P.P. Harvard University, J.D.
Candidate, SUNY, University at Buffalo, May 2001. I would like to thank Univer-
sity at Buffalo Professors Charles Ewing, Sheila Shulman and Anthony Szczygiel,
for their instrumental and unwavering support on this project.
I Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements
And Compulsory Licenses, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 245 (1997); Blood and
Gore; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative goes too far in promoting interests of
US drug companies abroad, THE NATION, July 19, 1999, at 16.
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countries to achieve lower priced drugs. 2 In addition, parallel imports bene-
fit many European Community countries, where the government is the chief
payer for health care services, including pharmaceuticals. For example in
1995, an identical amount of the antibiotic Amoxil, made by SmithKline
Beecham, cost $ 8 in Pakistan, $ 14 in Canada, $ 36 in the United States,
$40 in Indonesia and $ 60 in Germany. 3 Parallel importing would lessen
the pricing gap.
"Compulsory licensing" allows regular licensure grants to a third
party that will manufacture a drug still under patent. The third-party licen-
see is able to use the patented product or process.4 In return, the patentee
has a right to adequate royalty payments, 5 at a rate set by the host legisla-
ture. Wider access to drugs, stimulated by economic mechanisms, aims to
increase the supply for the use of AZT, taxol, protease inhibitors, and other
drugs intended to counter the progression of AIDS, within South Africa.
The response to South Africa's initiative was combative. Forty ma-
jor drug companies sued, countering the bold Act in an attempt to protect
pharmaceutical patent rights and corporate profits. The United States added
more fuel to the fire and waged an aggressive campaign to reverse the
South African law.
' During the fierce, two-year campaign against SAMMDRA, mem-
bers of the global public health community and consumer interest groups
joined forces to protest the pharmaceutical industry's efforts. As a result of
the sustained pressure, the United States eventually withdrew the suit in
September 1999. For its part, South Africa agreed to abide by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Trade-Related Intellectual
Properties Rights (TRIPS) provisions in implementing subsequent drug
initiatives.
However, the apparent change in the U.S. posture toward SAMM-
DRA 15 (c) did not eliminate the ongoing broader dilemma of balancing
public health concerns and pharmaceutical patent rights. This article ex-
plores how that dilemma was manifest within the South African context. It
examines how changes in political posture should further manifest into con-
2 See Ralph Nader, Al Gore Bullies South Africa on U.S.-made AIDS drugs,
KNIGHT RIDDER TRIBUNE, April 26, 1999, at Commentary.
3 See Robert Weissman , Insight on the News, NEws WORLD COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., Sept. 13, 1999, at 40.
4 Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements
and Compulsory Licenses, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 246 (1997).
5 LANCET JOURNAL, Mar. 3, 1999. On Compulsory drug licensing for countries
hit by HIV.
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crete policies. It posits that the United States Trade Commission must
adopt less restrictive trade standards to other countries concerned.
This article contains four parts. Part I highlights the AIDS/HIV
epidemic, with an emphasis in Africa. Part II examines South Africa's re-
sponse with its HIV/AIDS crisis through SAMMDRA and provides a dis-
cussion of the relevant legislative provisions, including a detailed review of
parallel importing and compulsory licensing. Part III assesses the responses
of U.S. interests by examining perspectives from the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and the pharmaceutical industries. Part IV seeks alternatives
to the crises with an evaluation of the U.S. trade policy and the World
Health Organization (WHO) in light of existing rules and laws under the
World Trade Organization (WTO), including the Bayh-Dole Act.6 The pa-
per concludes with an exploration of the advantages and disadvantages of
maintaining current trade policies. It provides a discussion of alternate ap-
proaches based on the assertion that the U.S. must apply to its new pharma-
ceutical trade policy reform with South Africa to all countries seeking
equitable and consistent trade and health policies.
I. THE GRAVITY OF THE GLOBAL AIDS/HIV EPIDEMIC
The AIDS epidemic is the critical public health challenge for most
developing nations. Sub-Saharan Africa is dramatically affected. Only
10% of the world's population reside in this region; however, it bears a
staggering 70% of the world's new AIDS cases.7
One in seven Kenyans and one in four Zimbabweans have HIV/
AIDS.8 In South Africa, 22 percent of adults are HIV positive.9 South
African life expectancy was 59 years in 1990; by 2010, life expectancy may
be less than 40 years. 10
The Report on the Presidential Mission on Children Orphaned by
AIDS reveals that deaths resulting from AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa will
exceed the number of people that died in Europe during the plague of
6 See 35 U.S.C.S. §202 (c)(4) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
7 Congressman Jesse L. Jackson, Jr., The U.S. Role in Combating the Global
HIV/AIDS Epidemic, Prepared Statement before the House Government Reform
Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
(July 22, 1999), available in LEXIS, FEDNEW File.
8 See Weissman, supra note 3, at 40.
9 See id.
10 See id.
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1347. l" The U.S. Surgeon General estimated the current number of sub-
Saharan Africans infected with HIV/AIDS at 22 million. 12 Over the next
ten years, AIDS will kill more people in sub-Sahara Africa than the total
number of casualties in all wars of the 20th Century, each day 5,500 die in
the region from AIDS-related causes.' 3
Africa is not alone in this devastating crisis. There are 6.7 million
people infected in East and Southern Asia and 1.4 million infected in Latin
America. 14 For the most part, these areas represent poor countries that can-
not afford high drug prices to ameliorate the disease. The capacity of any
country to treat HIV/AIDS patients relates to the level of the country's in-
come and the rate of infection. Consequently, most of the 30 million HIV/
AIDS patients in poor countries will die with a shorter life span, from an
inability to afford drugs or adequate health care services. 5
Top drug treatments in the United States coupled with a high stan-
dard of living enable many people with HIV/AIDS to live relatively healthy
lives for an increasingly longer period. However, in much of Africa this is
not the case. Most Africans with HIV/AIDS die rather quickly.' 6 HIV/
AIDS-drug cocktails cost about $12,000 a year in many African countries,
which represents a cost that is prohibitive for most of the growing African
population with HIV/AIDS.
Accordingly, the HIV and AIDS crisis is a global public-health cri-
sis that evokes economic demands for dramatic and swift interventions.
That is why nations such as South Africa have responded by instituting
policies that will stimulate and ease access to affordable essential
medicines.
II. SAMMDRA: THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO ITS
HIV/AIDS CRISIS
In 1997, at the height of the AIDS epidemic, the South African
government proposed policy changes in SAMMDRA. The objectives of
" Testimony, James Love Director House Government Reform U.S. Role in
Combating HIV/AIDS Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testi-
mony, July 25, 1999. Section: Capital Hill Hearing Testimony July 22, 1999.
12 See id.
'3 Africa at-Large; AIDS Drug Policy, AFRICA NEWS, Sept. 7, 1999.
14 Ralph Nader, James Love, Robert Weissman, Letter to Charlene Barshefsky
(Regarding Review of U.S. Trade Policy as it Relates to Access to Essential Drugs)
(Oct. 6, 1999) (visited Jan. 17, 2001) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/country/cb-
Oct6-99.html>. See also, Love <http://www.cptech.org>.
15 See id.
16 Weissman, supra note 3.
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SAMMDRA included: (1) diminishing what were viewed as unethical mar-
keting practices of international pharmaceutical companies; (2) promoting
the practice of prescribing drugs by generic rather than brand names; and
(3) legalizing parallel importing of pharmaceuticals.1 7 The combined intent
of these objectives was to reduce drug costs.
Not surprisingly, large pharmaceutical companies balked, prefer-
ring different market prices in different countries, directed to maximize
their profits. Pharmaceutical companies waged a campaign to discourage
South Africa from parallel importing, asserting that the practice of parallel
importing violated their patent protection rights. However, the South Afri-
can government found nothing in its patent laws consistent with the drug
companies' assertions.
In response, the South African government sought to buttress their
position by adding the following language to the SAMMDRA as a protec-
tive measure: "notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Patents
Act" the Minister of Health can "prescribe conditions for the supply of
more affordable medicines." Those provisions were included in Section
15(c). 18
As modified, SAMMDRA 15 (c) explicitly authorized both parallel
importing and compulsory licensing. It granted the Health Minister power
to act in the interest of public health by ensuring that patent rights for any
drug would not hinder the South African government from issuing a license
to a third party to produce the same drug. It also allowed both cheaper
imports from drug producing countries and generic substitution. 19
III. RESULTS OF SAMMDRA: CURRENT RESPONSES AND POSITIONS ON
SOUTH AFRICA'S DRUG POLICIES As WELL As SOUTH AFRICA'S AND THE
DEVELOPING WORLD'S PERSPECTIVES ON COMPULSORY LICENSING
AND PARALLEL IMPORTS
Although drug manufactures in the developed world reap great
profits from their products, the basis of that profit margin is on the purchas-
ing power of buyers with distinct endowments. For the most part, custom-
ers from developed countries can afford to pay the high costs of the drugs
than customers from poorer developed countries. Therefore, one of the
most important benefits of compulsory licenses is that they allow lower
17 Nader, supra note 14.
18 See id.
19 See, e.g., South African Drug Makers Suspend Constitutional Challenges to
SAMMDRA, MARKETLETTER, Sept. 17, 1999.
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prices for patent protected commodities. 20 Under a compulsory licensing
scheme, governments allow parties other than the patentees to manufacture
the patented products. Market competition results, inevitably driving prices
downward. 21 Compulsory licensing, combined with savvy purchasing by
interested buyers, has been shown to reduce the prices of some drugs by 30
to 95 percent. 22
Compulsory licensing may also be advantageous for technology
transfers. It allows third parties to commercialize technology that the origi-
nal patentees may not have initially exploited or used. 23 Compulsory li-
censing is often the only means that allows the patentee's transfer of
technology within countries that normally could not import the patented
item.24
EXPLANATION OF TRIPS
When the World Trade Organization was created, a number of
countries signed an agreement known as Trade Related Intellectual Prop-
erty, or "TRIPS". The TRIPS accord establishes minimum international
standards for patents, copyrights and trademarks. The accord also contains
specific provisions on compulsory licenses and parallel imports.
TRIPS bars parties from parallel importing on patented items with-
out the permission of the patentee. The TRIPS agreement allows compul-
sory licensing only when a country abides by the "safeguards" articulated in
Article 31. One safeguard requires payment of adequate compensation to
patent owners, typically in the form of a royalty or a percentage in sales
revenue.
The WHO does not have the authority; however, to adjudicate any
disputes that arise from violations of TRIPS. Nonetheless, the accord re-
quires signatories, under specific circumstances, including national health
emergencies such as AIDS, to grant a license to local companies, allowing
these third-parties to manufacturer patented pharmaceuticals for domestic
use.25 Moreover, TRIPS does not allow compulsory licensing granted
under the public health provision to be challenged under the WTO if pat-
20 See AFRICA NEWS, supra note 13.
21 See Weissman , supra note 3.
22 See Nader, supra note 14.
23 See id; see also Barbara Crossette, Gore Presides Over Rare Security Council
Debate on AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at A3.
24 See id.
25 Simon Barber, AIDS Activists Agenda called into question. Concessions by
U.S. Vice-President Al Gore have not stopped protests, BusINESs DAY (South Af-
rica), Sept. 3, 1999, at 2.
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ented items are imported through channels that are not authorized by the
patent-holders. 26 U.S. policy considers that TRIPS sets the minimum stan-
dard of intellectual property protection that signatories have to provide.
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES' PERSPECTIVES
Pressure to suppress compulsory licensing and parallel imports
which South Africa experienced earlier, stemmed from multinational phar-
maceutical companies, which in turn sought U.S. support in waging a
global campaign to prohibit countries from dishonoring patent protection
rights.
The companies maintained that such practices unfairly infringe on
intellectual property rights and diminish corporate profits and the ability to
expand R & D efforts. 27 The U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) response
in the South African example was overwhelmingly supportive of the phar-
maceutical industries. That attitude changed when public health and con-
sumer rights advocates alerted the U.S. trade representatives of the alarming
death rates associated with AIDS. The advocates highlighted grave public
health consequences of U.S.T.R. policy, particularly in relation to the in-
creasing rate of infection and death in Africa. In short, the balance between
profits and lives needed leveling.
In May 1999, successful lobbying efforts by public health and con-
sumer rights interests groups promulgated the World Health Assembly
(WHA) 28 to pass a resolution that declared public health concerns "para-
mount" to intellectual property rights.29 Although the United States had
previously opposed efforts to pass a similar resolution, on that occasion it
did not.30
Although the pharmaceutical companies are opposed to parallel im-
ports and compulsory licensing, such practices are legal by the WTO stan-
dards. 31 Regardless, the United States has a history of joining
pharmaceutical companies and actively opposing countries that implement
strategies that intended to widen drug access. Revealing the political di-
mension of the issue, and how important the support of the pharmaceutical
companies is on a global scale, the Vice President and former Democratic
Presidential nominee Al Gore came out in opposition to efforts to reduce
26 See id.
27 See AFRICA NEWS, supra note 13.
28 This is the policy-making body of the WTO.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See AFRICA NEWS, supra note 13.
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the cost of life-saving pharmaceuticals in Sub Saharan countries. Public
pressure and political interests came to bear to reverse the position of Vice
President Gore. He is among those now concerned in addressing public
health in trade policies. 32
A close examination of U.S. trade policies reveals that the United
States practices parallel imports and compulsory licenses in other areas.
Ironically, the government regularly issues its own compulsory licenses on
pollution control devices, pesticides and computer processing chips.33
Given the United State's own practices with parallel imports and
compulsory licensing, trade negotiations surrounding those concerns
smacked of "bad faith," specifically with respect to South Africa and their
concerted efforts to modify SAMMDRA 15(c).
The recent policy shift on SAMMDRA 15(c) by the United States
may acknowledge a dire need to assist South Africa improve its public
health crisis (with respect to HIV/AIDS and increase its access to essential
drugs). 34 Time will reveal if systemic and programmatic changes parallel
the United State's recent attitudinal change. Moreover, the future will show
whether long-term substantive changes emerge in the United State's foreign
policies.
CURRENT RESULTS FROM SAMMDRA
The office of USTR agreed in the fall of 1999 to stop lobbying
against South African legislation SAMMDRA. The implication was that
South Africa was free to allow local manufacturers to engage in compulsory
licensing without U.S. opposition and South African President Thabo
Mbeki could authorize parallel importing outside of channels authorized by
patent holders in South Africa.35
An amended bill emerged in early 2000 because Pretoria High
Court in July 1999 asserted that the previously published Act lacked neces-
sary schedules to control medicinal products. 36As a result of U.S. pressure
on South African drug policies, Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang nevertheless made a decision to "take advice" on SAMMDRA
15(c) in the fall of 1999.
32 Barbara Crossette, Gore Presides Over Rare Security Council Debate on AIDS,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at A3.
33 See AFRICA NEWS, supra note 13.
31 See Nader, supra note 14.
35 Simon Barber, South Africa, Clinton Pledges Help in tackling AIDS, AFRICA
NEws, Sept. 22, 1999.
36 See id.
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The upshot of the Health Ministry' response to SAMMDRA 15(c),
which may have been the result of external pressures, is that the South Afri-
can Manufacturers Association suspended its constitutional challenges to
SAMMDRA. 37 Other intervening factors influenced the course of the legis-
lation. Section 15(c) was undergoing challenges in the Pretoria High Court
by the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association and 41 co-
petitioners, including several South African companies and local U.S. and
European subsidiaries. The litigants were in the process of negotiating an
out-of-court settlement with the Health Minister that considered industry as
a partner rather than an antagonist.3 8
Another intervening factor is that the South African Government
recently refused to provide AIDS drugs for pregnant women with HIV. This
occurred despite that studies have demonstrated AZT's effectiveness in re-
ducing by 50% the risk that the virus would pass on to their babies. An
estimated 10% of babies born each year in South Africa has the virus; trans-
mission in some 35,000 potentially could be prevented by administration of
AZT or other drugs. 39
Dr. Costa Gazi, a South African health care provider, challenged
the government's refusal to provide anti-AIDS drugs to pregnant women. 40
The Government's response was that it could not afford to provide AZT.
The cost of screening pregnant women for HIV and subsequent counseling
sessions would be approximately $390 - a cost prohibitively high for South
Africa.
41
Quixotically, President Thabo Mbeki puzzled South African and
anti-AIDS advocates in September 1999 by telling parliament that AZT is
dangerous, when the drug had been approved by regulators in South Africa
and around the world as a treatment for AIDS. Moreover, during spring
2000, Mbeki stated that HIV does not cause AIDS, contradicting conclu-
sions drawn from science, and creating a confusing uproar among public
health workers and South Africans. Taking all of these events and attitudes
together, it is uncertain what South Africa's intentions are with respect to
37 See id.
38 See Barber supra note 35.
39 Andrew Selsky, Boston Globe Online, South African Physicians Fighting for
Lives of Thousands of Babies Threatened by AIDS, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1999;
CDC National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention News Update. Nov. 8,
1999.
40 See id.
41 See id.
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HIV/AIDS policies, despite its new Parliamentary posture on SAMMDRA
and U.S. slight easing of pressure.42
COMPULSORY LICENSING PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE WTO
Although earlier critiques challenged SAMMDRA, under the
World Trade Organization, compulsory licensing is permissible as long as
the government follows certain procedures to protect the patent holder's
interests. Such interests include payments of reasonable royalties, which
often receive standard compliance. Moreover, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade permits compulsory licensing which is regularly used in
industrialized countries including the United States, Japan, and the Euro-
pean Union. 43 Parallel imports are also legal under WTO standards. 44
Nonetheless, the United States has repeatedly alleged that the
WTO-TRIPS accord does not permit the South African initiatives. 45 Yet,
the United States refused to bring its concerns under the WTO dispute reso-
lution framework. 46 The underlying reason could be that Vice President
Gore and the pharmaceutical industries were aware that the South Africans
did abide by international trade rules. In fact, United States officials con-
ceded that before the recent USTR policy change, South Africa's policies
were permissible by the WTO. 47
Another ironic charge is that the United States, along with most
governments, already has the authority to issue compulsory licenses to pat-
ented products. For example, the United States can issue compulsory li-
censes under the Clean Air Act,48 for nuclear power,49 for public health
purposes under the Bayh-Dole Act, 50 for government use, 51 and as a mea-
sure for anti-competitive practices under United States antitrust laws.
Furthermore, certain United States leaders are pursuing legalization
of parallel import policies in the U.S. Democratic Party. Leaders in the
House of Representatives have held briefings to draw attention to a cam-
paign that would relieve prescription drug prices for senior citizens while
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 AFRICA NEWS, supra note 27.
45 Love, supra note 14.
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 42 USC §7608 (1995).
49 42 USC §2138 (2000).
50 35 USC §203 (2000).
51 28 USC §1498 (2000)
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also criticizing drug manufacturers.5 2 Democratic members of Congress
who spoke at the briefing all claimed that senior citizens face "discrimina-
tion" because companies charge them higher rates than those available to
bulk purchasers (such as health maintenance organizations and insurance
companies). 53
Democrats last year introduced a number of bills to enforce reduc-
tion in the costs of drugs for the elderly. These Congress members also
included bills that would: (1) ensure seniors obtain the same rates as the
most preferred customers; (2) force drug companies to give up their patents
if they charged too much for drugs; and (3) allow for parallel imports for
medicines. 54
Representative Bernard Sanders (Independent - Vermont) reported
that he and a group of Congressional Democrats were interested in allowing
parallel imports of drugs from countries such as Canada and Mexico where
prices are considerably lower than in the United States.55 Pharmaceutical
companies have challenged the legislative intent by asserting that parallel
imports are dangerous because it allows for the importation of substandard
unregulated drugs, an issue addressed later in this paper.
EUROPEAN UNION PARTICIPATION IN THE PARALLEL IMPORT AND
COMPULSORY LICENSING MARKETS
Despite historical resistance from within the United States, parallel
imports of pharmaceutical drugs are common in several European coun-
tries. 56 In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, governments provided
financial incentives to encourage dispensing of parallel imports. In some
instances penalties exist for noncompliance. 57 Parallel trade has developed
52 Steve Usdin, U.S. Dems Mount Drive to Cut Drug Prices, CHEM. NEWS AND
INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 28, 1999.
53 See id.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 There are significant levels of parallel trade in four of the European states:
Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Also, Sweden and
Norway represent country markets in which parallel importing is likely to increase
over the next few years. The market sizes in the respective countries are as follows:
Denmark: 9%; Germany: 2%; Netherlands: 13%; United Kingdom: 8%. In Ger-
many, pharmacists are reluctant to dispense cheaper drugs, because of the financial
disincentives. Therefore, Germany has a low level of parallel imports when com-
pared to other countries. Dorlands Directories, I MED. AND HEALTH CARE MAR-
KETPLACE GUIDE 1-661 (1998).
57 See id.
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as a result of the enforcement of the European Union's principle of free
movement of goods and services. Several features of the European system
include: the imposition of a variety of national pricing control programs for
pharmaceuticals; price disparity among EC countries; and government pro-
grams that cover, at least in part, the cost of prescription drugs.5 8
Much European import practice involves medicines manufactured
in two or more Member States and sold at significantly different ex-factory
prices. The parallel trader then purchases medicine in the low price country
and exports to the high price country. They are then sold in "parallel" with
the same medicine supplied directly from the domestic manufacturer. 59
European Community laws affecting parallel trade focus on the im-
portance of free movement of goods and services over patent protection
rights. Article 30 of the European Community Treaty establishes the rules
governing the free movement of goods and trade. It prohibits "quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect". Article
36 of the EC Treaty nevertheless provides exceptions to the basic rule by
stating that prohibitions or restrictions may be justified on several
grounds.60
Article 36 states that "The Provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit
justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants. .. .Such prohibi-
tions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." 61
The European Court of Justice has narrowed interpretation of Article 36,
asserting that the protection of intellectual property rights should not come
under a disguised restriction of trade within the meaning of the treaty.
The official European Union attitude to parallel trade is tolerance.
Parallel trade in the Netherlands led to the reference in the European Court
of Justice Article 117.62 Subsequent the Article emerged the "De Peijer"
judgement. It interpreted the provisions of Articles 30 to 36 and established
the legality of parallel imports.63 The European Court of Justice ruled that
58 See id.
59 Joseph Darbra and Joan Rovira, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals in the
European Union, 14 PHARMACoECONOMICS 129, 131-136 (1998).
60 Jean Pierre Quintin, TREATY OF ROME, TRITE'S ET DocUMENTS RELATIFS A' LA
CEE. (La documentation francaise) (Paris 1984).
61 TREATY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Feb 7, 1992. DOCE No. C/224.31.8.92.
62 Supra note 60.
63 Case 104/75, Offieve van Justice vs de Peijer, 1976 E.C.R. 613, 1976 C.M.L.R.
271.
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patients can import cheaper over-the-counter medicines for their own use
from a pharmacy in another member state, provided that the product is au-
thorized for sale in their own home country.
The European Commission also supports parallel trade. It contrib-
uted to a Commission Communication in 1982, and intended to serve as a
guideline for national authorities. Subsequently, all national authorities
within the European Union have adopted it. The main elements of the
Communication closely parallel the holding of the European Court of Jus-
tice in the "De Peijer" case. In essence, the importing countries must verify
imports are authorized and comply with EU guidelines, as well as adhere to
good manufacturing practices in the production of imported goods. 64
CANADA
In 1969, Canada amended its Patent Act to authorize compulsory
licenses for both the import and the manufacture of patented pharmaceuti-
cals.65 The reasons for the changes included a need to encourage develop-
ing a generic drug industry that would help counter the rising rate of
pharmaceutical expenditures. The amendments required grants for compul-
sory licenses for the importation as well as manufacture of drugs. 66 A roy-
alty fee was established, while allowing the inventor "due reward" for
research and development. 67 The results were dramatic reductions in drug
prices for Canadian consumers. 68
There was strong opposition to compulsory licensing for imports
from the research-intensive firms- the "patentees." At that time, Canada
was the only developed country with a compulsory licensing system. With
the passage of provincial laws that encouraged generic substitution, re-
search intensive firms faced erosion of market share. 69 American Home
Products sought an order prohibiting the Commissioner of Patents from tak-
ing further proceedings on the pharmaceutical company, Inglis
64 Commission Communication: parallel importation of medicinal products, May
6, 1982.
65 Patent Act, R.S.C. ch P-4, sec 41.
66 Patent Act R.S.C.ch P-4, sec. 41 (4).
67 Frank W. Homer Ltd. v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 61 C.P.R. 243, 245 (1970)
(in some instances, up to 4%).
68 Hearings Before the Subcomm, on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. (1987) (testimony of
H.C. Eastman, Prof. Of Econs., Univ. of Toronto).
69 Sheila Shulman and Barbara Richard, The 1987 Canadian Patent Law Amend-
ments: Revised Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing Provisions, FOOD AND
DRUG COSMETIC LAW JOURNAL at 748 (1988).
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Pharmaceuticals Ltd., with an interest in manufacturing generic drugs. 70 In
that case, the court held that section 41(4) of the Patent Act was valid be-
cause it pertained to law in relation to patents and not in relation to property
and civil rights. 7'
However, in 1987 further amendments significantly restricted broad
licensing authority by guaranteeing patentees a longer period of effective
patent life. 72 The restrictions aimed at increasing the levels of research and
development (R & D) within Canada with the hopeful creation of new jobs.
The Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association (PMAC) and the
Conservative Tory government supported the Amendments. However, two
other major political parties, the Liberal and New Democratic Parties, and
the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association, representing the generic in-
dustry, opposed. Concerns centered on future drug prices, as well as
whether or not jobs or R & D would increase.73
Research-intensive firms committed themselves to doubling their R
& D investment from a 4.9% to a10% sales revenue by 1996. They ex-
pected to create 3000 new scientific and research jobs which would be a
17% increase, and channel 30% of the new increased levels of R & D ex-
penditures into Canadian Universities, hospitals and research centers. 74
An updated report concluded that PMAC failed to deliver on the
projections mentioned.75 The percentage of new drugs released between
1991 - 1995 that did not substantially improve therapy, after an average of
$89 million was spent yearly on basic research, was 92%.76 (Compare ex-
penditures with $1billion amount spent per year by pharmaceutical compa-
nies in product promotion.) Moreover, the number of jobs eliminated in the
brand name pharmaceutical sector (PMAC) was 2,055 between 1990-
1995.77
70 American Home Products Corp. v. Commissioner of Patents, 62 C.P.R. 155,
158 (O.A.C. 1970).
71 Id. at 160.
72 Shulman and Richard, supra note 69 at 745.
73 Id. at 755.
74 CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFF. CAN., Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals: A Review of Section 41 of the Patent Act, at 8 (June 1983).
75 Canadian Health Coalition, Bill C-91: A monopoly for drug companies... is
bad for your health and Medicare <www.discribe.ca/nbnurses/billc9l.htex>.
76 See id.
77 See id.
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OTHER RESPONSES OF U.S. INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO PARALLEL
IMPORTING AND COMPULSORY LICENSING
In the past few years, the Office of the US Trade Representative
(USTR), whose role is to promote American commercial interests abroad,
has been an aggressive ally of the drug industry. One objective of the
USTR has been to discourage the use of generic drugs abroad through
threats of trade sanctions.78 Although drug costs account for up to 60 per-
cent of the healthcare budget in poor countries, the United States govern-
ment has allied itself with the interests of brand named drug companies.
79
As discussed above, in direct response of South Africa's policy, the
United States launched a two-year effort to repeal or modify Section 15 (c)
of SAMMDRA. 80 Special U.S. trade task forces organized on the South
African issue while Vice President Gore frequently raised patent issues di-
rectly with South African officials. There was also bipartisan pressure from
the United States Congress.
Furthermore, in February 1999, the U.S. Department of State held a
briefing on the global HIV crisis, but disallowed discussions about United
States trade pressures on South Africa. In another bout of pressure aimed
against South Africa's policy, the USTR announced on April 30, 1999 a
special "out of cycle review" of South Africa's intellectual property policies
to be completed in September 1999 in order to add pressure for legislative
changes.
Although the U.S. pressure has subsided in South Africa with re-
spect to drug policies, the United States complained about compulsory li-
censing and parallel importing as "barriers to trade" at the WHO meeting in
1999. Consistent with other arsenal trade attacks, the comments squarely
aimed at warning other developing countries not to pursue policies consis-
tent with those of South Africa. Although South Africa is off the "hot
plate", other nations that have enacted measure permitting compulsory li-
censing and parallel trade still face vehement opposition from the United
States.
For example, the USTR reports on pharmaceuticals reveal that the
United States government opposed similar policies in Thailand, Israel and
New Zealand. 8' In Thailand, the United States government opposed com-
pulsory licensing, parallel imports, price controls, and government attempts
78 See THE NATION, supra note 1.
79 See id.
80 Love, supra note 14.
81 AFRICA NEWS, supra note 20.
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to collect economic information about drug prices and development costs,
measures considered by United States to be barriers to trade.
In response to Israeli policies, the United States government op-
posed parallel imports, compulsory licensing and the Israeli adoption of the
"Bolar" provision which permits the speedier introduction of generic drugs
following a patent expiration. 82 Ironically, this proviso modeled the United
States' policy.
In New Zealand, the United States government declared that New
Zealand's use of reference pricing could adversely affect a pharmaceutical
company's revenue from sales of its patented product. Furthermore, the
USTR claims that New Zealand's practice of using competition to negotiate
the best prices, is an obstacle to United State's trade.83
The results of the seemingly contradictory U.S. trade policy is that
on the one hand, the United States is a staunch advocate of freer market
economies. Yet on the other hand, and with respect to the pharmaceutical
industries, the United States aims to maintain a strong-hand as the dominant
price-setter in countries whose poor inhabitants cannot afford to pay artifi-
cially exorbitant prices for essential drugs.
Moreover, United States drug-trade policy lags significantly behind
what may well be political rhetoric. In the September 1999 annual address
at the United Nations Assembly, U.S. President Bill Clinton stated he
would pledge to do more to ensure that HIV-positive mothers in developing
countries have access to drugs which diminish the likelihood of transmitting
the AIDS virus to their children.84
Clinton stated he would convene a White House meeting of phar-
maceutical CEOs, charitable foundations and the scientific community to
consider ways to confront the fact that only 2% of investments in vaccine
research was for diseases that afflict the poor. 85 Clinton added that improv-
ing health care in the developing world should be a part of "an unrelenting
battle against poverty and shared prosperity". 86 Albeit meaningful inten-
tions, a White House meeting falls short of the dire need of legislative and
executive changes in U.S. drug trade polices. No concrete policy proposals
emerged from that discussion at that time.
However, a United Nation's meeting occurred in Spring 2000
where Vice President Gore addressed South Africa's public health issue,
and stated that $150 million was being pledged by the United States Con-
82 Love supra note 14.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
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gress for combating the epidemic in Africa.87 Critics claim, however, that
this amount of aid is shy of what is necessary to combat the problem, when
compared to the billions of dollars spent on the war actions in Bosnia.
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE U.S. ACTIONS
Public health advocates argued United States trade officials acted in
"bad faith" when they told South Africa that any legislation providing for
compulsory licensing of patents of patented products on public health
grounds was a violation of the TRIPS.8 8 They reasoned that Article 27.1 of
the TRIPS states that patent rights should be enjoyed "without discrimina-
tion as to ... the field technology," and that any special program for com-
pulsory licensing on public health grounds is discriminatory. 89
Experts at the WTO and WHO took another view of the TRIPS
provision. They claimed there was wide latitude in TRIPS to provide for
compulsory licensing under Article 31 on many public interest grounds,
while maintaining the safeguards and requirements of remuneration.9" Fur-
thermore, past U.S. pressure on South Africa, and its current policies main-
tained toward other countries, are considered "bad faith" by these experts
- given the United States' own statutory programs for compulsory licens-
ing under the Bayh-Dole Act, the Clean Air Act, and Nuclear Energy Act.91
THE PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT RIGHTS
In the 1980s, Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act and the Steven-
son-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, later amended as the Federal Tech-
nology and Transfer Act of 1986.92 The primary purpose of the laws was to
bolster U.S competitiveness, while encouraging commercialization of basis
research discoveries. The Act provided federally funded incentives for pri-
vate sector investment. The Department of Health and Hilman Services
(DHHS) designated the NIH as the lead agency for the technology transfer
for the Public Health Service (PHS). 93
87 Barbara Crossette, Gore Presides Over Rare Security Council Debate on AIDS,
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000 at A-3.
88 James Love, Notes from discussion with a Vice President Gore representative
regarding GoreiMbeiki Commission and Compulsory Licensing disputes with
South Africa (Apr. 2, 1999) <http://www.cptech.org>.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See supra notes 48, 49, 50.
92 See id.
93 See THE NATION supra note 1.
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With respect to inventions developed through NIH funding, the
Bayh-Dole Act allows NIH grantee contractors the authority to retain title
to patents and to license inventions that result from the NIH funding.94 Al-
though the NIH is responsive to the economic development intent of the
legislation, it carries out its role along side its public health mission. The
PHS patent policy provides protection where further research and develop-
ment acutely recognizes the technology's primary use and its future for ef-
fective therapeutic diagnosed prevention. Exclusive licenses are granted
when patent rights guarantee product development. It is rare that technolo-
gies develop without some form of exclusive protection.
Protection is key to the pharmaceutical industry because develop-
ment costs for bringing the product to the market are too high. It takes
approximately fourteen years to market a successful drug and the costs gen-
erally exceed $360 million. 95 Although the U.S. government funds basic
research at a limited level, some critique the amounts are inadequate. 96 In-
vestors require a significant amount of private investments to conduct the
studies and pipeline research required for just one successful drug against
the many failures. 97
Because there are few gains when a technology does not reach the
market place, patent exclusivity is often justified. It is the pay-off and the
incentive for the inventor's investment. Critics assert that market exclusiv-
ity safeguards investments by assuring pharmaceutical manufacturers the
ability to charge considerably higher prices than the cost of manufacturing
alone. 98 Despite imperfection, this system resulted in many useful
pharmaceuticals.
An economic assumption is that companies would not undertake
development costs of inventions if they believe the government would al-
low third parties to practice inventions. Accordingly, the wisdom of trans-
ferring manufacturing or distribution rights to the WHO or any other
nonprofit organization is not certain. This is why pharmaceutical advocates
argue that successful technological transfer requires that the Government
protect intellectual property rights. Otherwise, undermining intellectual
property rights may dampen development of essential drugs.
94 See id.
95 Kate H. Murashige, AIDS Drug Raise Issue of Recoupment for R & D, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 27, 2000, at C10.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id.
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DISADVANTAGES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES FACED WITH THE
CURRENT CHANGING TRADE POLICES
Drug companies have experienced a decline in their stock value and
these companies point to parallel imports as a significant factor in this de-
cline. For example, Adock Ingram experienced a decline in their shares in
September 1999 and claimed it was due to compulsory licensing and paral-
lel import effects. 99
Glaxo-Wellcome said parallel imports were already costing the
company "tens of millions a year". Glaxo claims that were it not for paral-
lel trade, it clearly would have had more resources available to research
new medicines.100 Moreover, pharmaceutical companies assert that parallel
import and compulsory licenses curtail profits and reduce incentives for re-
search and development.
On the other hand, although providing incentives for research and
development is vital, many policies aimed at widening access to drugs do
not quantitatively and significantly affect research and development incen-
tives.10 1 For example, Africa is approximately only 1.6 percent of the
global market for pharmaceutical purchases. Therefore, for most drugs, es-
pecially for high-priced drugs, Africa is not a significant determining factor
for research and development efforts. Similarly, for high-priced drugs that
currently have no significant impact on domestic sales due to prohibitive
costs, compulsory licensing is likely to increase revenues from that market
by increasing sales volumes due to scale.
What then disturbs South African drug companies over legislation
such as SAMMDRA? The main concern of the pharmaceutical industry is
the marked contrast of selling a drug such as Fluconazole in Italy for
$23.50, but for only $0.95 in India. In short, companies may well be con-
cerned that cheap prices for pharmaceuticals in Africa may undermine an-
other country's willingness to pay high prices, for example in the U.S. or
European markets. 102 That in turn would dampen worldwide profits.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PARALLEL IMPORTS
Given the price disparity of pharmaceuticals as delineated in the
previous section, one may begin to understand that parallel trade is a form
99 Tammy Lloyd, Someone's in Need of a Good Dose of Salts, FINANCIAL MAIL
(South Africa), Sept. 24, 1999, at 70.
100 Paul Lashmar, NHS Goes Abroad to Buy Cheap Drugs, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), June 27, 1998, at 9.
101 Love, supra note 14.
102 See id.
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of imperfect arbitrage.1 03 The objective is to reduce price differentials to
more than the transaction costs of the arbitrage. Under parallel trades, often
the costs of the transaction include repackaging, relabeling, licensing and
transportation.°4
The effects of increased competition in most markets would in-
crease economic efficiency. This is because increased competition results
in undercutting the high cost and inefficient producers. However, this is not
the case in the pharmaceutical industry.
The pharmaceutical producers that invest in R & D are at a short-
term economic risk. The start-up costs are high and new market entrants do
not bear those initial costs. Therefore, arbitrage with respect to the pharma-
ceutical industry is damaging to long-term economic efficiency. 105
Accordingly, parallel trade magnifies the consequences of one
country holding price levels below economic cost of medicine production.
This is because prices all across the trading states would be the same. 10 6
Within the European Union, price equalization benefits from the
outcome of competition and the free movement of goods. However, where
there are substantial fixed costs, including research and development for
pharmaceuticals, then some economists suggest that the economic argu-
ments against forcing the equalization of prices become apparent.10 7
For one, price averaging would increase prices for poorer countries.
Such countries may be unable to sustain the same level of purchase price
and quantity that high-income countries can afford. Inevitably, they argue,
patients will suffer.10 8 Second, some economists contend that price equali-
zation involves an indirect transfer of money from poor countries to rich
ones. 109
There are counter arguments to both of the proposed assumptions.
The first argument assumes an average price above marginal cost. How-
ever, prices resulting from parallel trade could reflect either at marginal cost
or below marginal cost, both of which would capture the greater market
share, rendering above marginal cost prospects unlikely (unless there is
collusion).
103 Joseph Darba and Joan Rovira, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals in the Eu-
ropean Union, 14 PHARMACOECONOMICS 129, 131-136 (1998).
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id. at 134.
107 See id. at 134.
108 See id. at 134.
1o See id. at 131-136.
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Furthermore, the economists do not explain how equalization re-
flects an indirect transfer of funds from poorer to richer countries. Simply
because there has been the effect of averaging does not necessarily mean
that the mathematical consequences average as such with respect to trade.
Although richer countries pay lower prices, it is not at the expense of the
poorer countries that do not recognize benefits from lowered prices. In fact,
because of their average income, higher income countries benefit more.
Accordingly, there may be no indirect transfer of resources from poorer to
richer countries as the economists suggest. If anything, the transfer results
from richer countries subsidizing the consumption for poorer countries, be-
cause it is the rich countries that can afford the research and development,
manufacturing and the distribution of drugs. It is the poorer countries that
benefit from these fixed costs at the "expense" from the rich.
Moreover, because the intended consumers presumably cannot af-
ford the drugs at costs that it would take to account for R & D costs, these
sales could otherwise be lost. It is therefore difficult to see how this scheme
would negatively affect a patent holder's return of investment when the
choice may diminish to either sales at a reasonable price or no sales at all." 0
THE INDUSTRY CLAIMS DISADVANTAGES FOR DEVELOPING REGIONS:
Drug companies claim parallel trade can be dangerous. Drugs may
deteriorate through poor handling, and they often become contaminated
during repackaging. Moreover in some countries with lax controls, drugs
have been given to English speaking patients with Spanish or Italian
instructions.' I
The South African Parliament recently stated that the introduction
of parallel imports could lead to an influx of counterfeit and substandard
drugs. Failure to subject these imports to the same rigorous controls as
locally manufactured products could lead to a barrage of second rate
medicines. Due to the vagueness of the legislation, the South African health
minister has wide powers to regulate health care without following the par-
liamentary debate process.
According to the pharmaceutical group Adcock Ingram, the com-
pany's latest annual report stated the benefits flowing from parallel imports
of cheaper medicines were questionable. 12
Pharmaceutical companies criticize compulsory licensing for pro-
ducing substandard drugs when manufactured by the licensee. Although
110 Murashige, supra note 95.
"1l Supra note 100.
112 Supra note 99.
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generic purity and effectiveness standards can be insured through "bioe-
quivalence testing," developing countries struggle in achieving competent
results. For example, although Brazil recently passed the Generics Law,
which authorizes the generic production of brand name drug products, there
are currently only four laboratories in Brazil with the capacity to conduct
bioequivalency testing.' 13 The Government has admitted "that the current
structure is still precarious, due to the complexity and cost" of the tests. 114
How EUROPE DEALS WITH QUALITY CONTROL OF PARALLEL IMPORTS
Parallel importers in the European Union focus on the latest, best
selling patent-protected lines. The centralized European procedure for re-
gistration [carried out by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency
(EMEA)] has an affect in that area, and most likely will be the normal
regulatory route for most new and therapeutically innovative medicines in
the future." 15
Because of the evaluation carried out by the EMEA, centrally ap-
proved medicines have single "Summary of Product Characteristics," label-
ing, packaging and patient information leaflets in all official European
Union languages. As a result, language-specific texts are approved and
available for parallel importers to use.' 16
The US public interest position on the matter centers on economic
equity. Given the United States government (through its tax base) contrib-
utes to the development of a significant portion of essential drugs, (such as
those that remedy HIV/AIDS),' '7 it is tl'.refore unwise to inflate the prices
of essential drugs when companies, not taxpayers, reap direct economic
profits. This position has garnered much criticism, as well as generated
global support and pressure for alternative solutions.
EXAMINING THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Enacting WHA-EBI03/4
In light of the current U.S. stance on parallel imports and compul-
sory licensing in South Africa, the global health community is now mobiliz-
ing to have the USTR adopt a broader global view in its trade policies with
respect to public health.
113 Brazil Passes Generics Legislation, MARKETLETTFER, Sept. 6, 1999.
114 See id.
I"5 See supra note 103.
116 Supra note 103.
117 See id.
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In May of 1999, the World Health Assembly (WHA) enacted a
"Revised Drug Strategy" resolution: (EB103/4). The resolution passed with
U.S. government support and requires member countries to:
(1) reaffirm their commitment to developing, implementing and moni-
toring national drug policies and to take all necessary concrete mea-
sures in order to ensure equitable access to essential drugs;
(2) ensure that public health interests are paramount in pharmaceutical
and health policies;
(3) Explore and review their options under relevant international agree-
ments, including trade agreements, to safeguard access to essential
drugs.'l 8
To date, the Resolution has not been implemented. Under EB 103/
4, a policy review should have been conducted on essential issues. For
example, the U.S. government has requested countries to limit the scope of
compulsory licensing to cases involving anti-competitive practices, national
emergencies and air pollution control.1 19
U.S. position at this point is inconsistent. In Thailand, where there
are at least one million HIV/AIDS patients, the U.S. government has op-
posed the use of compulsory licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs. Accordingly,
the U.S. should reconsider its opposition to compulsory licenses in Thailand
where public health groups such as Medicines Sans Frontier support the use
of compulsory licensing to acquire drugs such as ddl, 3TC, d4T or Novir to
combat AIDS. In essence, the USTR should consider extending the policy
held in South Africa to all developing countries. 120
Allowing the WHO the Right to Health Care Patents Held by the
U.S. Government
The global public health community has proposed that the NIH
enter into an agreement with the WHO to allow the WHO the right to use
health care patents held by the U.S. government.' 21
118 Ralph Nader, James Love, Robert Weissman, Letter to U.S. Trade Rep.
Charlene Barshefsky (regarding review of U.S. trade policy as it relates to access to
essential drugs) (Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/country/cb-oct.6-
99.html>.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 Ralph Nader, James Love, Letter to Dr. Harold Varmus (Director of NIH, ask-
ing for NIH to give the WHO access to U.S. government funded medical inven-
tions) (Sept. 3, 1999) <http://www.cptech.org>.
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The U.S. government holds public use rights on government
spurned inventions, which include many important AIDS drugs, such as
ddl, d4t, 3tC or Ritonavir, and other medicines. 122
Based on the principle of "public use technologies," consumer ad-
vocate groups claim that it is possible for the United States to retain the
right to practice the invention on behalf of any foreign government or inter-
national organization that is a signatory to any existing or future treaty or
agreement with the United States. 23 This may follow, because the United
States retains rights on inventions that they fund through grants and con-
tracts at universities and small businesses under the Bayh-Dole Act. More-
over, the U.S. government has an eminent domain right to practice patented
technology. 24 "This is indistinguishable from a compulsory license."' 125
Therefore, according to consumer rights advocates, the U.S. may have
worldwide rights to practice or have practiced inventions on its behalf.
Moreover, the U.S. may require that foreign governments or international
organizations have the right to use inventions under 37 CFR 401.14.126
Although many public health groups have pressured the Vice Presi-
dent and other Administration officials to support efforts to give the WHO
the right to practice these inventions in poor countries, the U.S. has declined
to do so. The Government has its reasons. The then Director of the NIH,
Dr. Harold Varmus, attests that the Government's royalty-free license al-
lows it to have no-cost use of a technology it invented or funded. However
it does not provide rights or access to a licensee's final product. However,
allowing the owner of the technology, or the licensor the ability to conduct
further research is often provided in the context of an exclusive license. 27
Further, microeconomic theory reveals that compulsory licensing
will increase sales as prices decrease. Accordingly, some believe that these
policies will not harm industry earnings to the extent that drug companies
122 See id. (The relevant statutes and regulations are 35 U.S.C 202 (c)(4) of the
Bayh-Dole Act and 37 CFR 404.7. where the government allows public use rights
on inventions). See also Murashige supra note 95.
123 Love, supra note 14.
124 28 U.S.C. 1498 (a) (2000).
125 Murashige, supra note 95; see also Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999). (Where it appeared that any state could manufacture drugs for
its citizens without paying royalties).
126 Nader et. al., supra at 118; see also supra note 14.
127 Dr. Harold Varmus, Letter from NIH Director, to Ralph Nader, James Love,
and Robert Weissman (responding to their request calling on the NIH to provide the
WHO access to US government funded inventions) (Oct. 19, 1999) <http://
www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/varmusletteroct 19.html>.
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contend. 2 8 As compulsory licensing expands access to AZT and ddl in
Africa and in developing regions without reducing prices in the U.S. and
Europe, then companies could gain in revenues. This is because drug sales
in developing regions are low because prices are too prohibitive. 129
Although it is believed by consumer advocacy groups that the
United States can license patent rights to the WHO, there are nevertheless,
doubts regarding WHO's authority to practice inventions under the Govern-
ment use license. 130 Moreover, leadership within the NIH attests that it
does not necessarily have to intervene on behalf of a foreign country when
that intervention is (1) unsolicited and (2) alternatives exist for those coun-
tries to achieve results similar to those that may result under compulsory
licensing.13 1 Such alternatives may place the current system at risk without
necessarily allowing greater accessibility to essential drugs by developing
regions. Consequently, action under the WHO and the NIH, with respect to
NIH supported patent rights, are unlikely.
GLOBAL ACCESS TO DRUGS AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The AIDS crisis in South Africa and in developing countries is a
public health problem that encompasses much broader issues than access to
anti-viral drugs. The drug supply issue must be weighed against other
equally important issues such as public health programs, treatment, moni-
toring compliance, medical infrastructure, and the emergence of drug resis-
tant HIV-strains. 13 2 Nevertheless, there exists a need to confront methods
of gaining access to vital drugs.
In terms of market revenue, the developing world markets are a
very small income source for the pharmaceutical industry. The market rep-
resents only about 10% of international sales and just 1.6% in the continent
of Africa. 133 Despite that, drug companies would prefer the freedom to set
any pharmaceutical price they' 13 4 deem fitting. Is it reasonable to allow such
free domain to any entity that controls life saving technologies?
Liberalization of pharmaceutical patent rights is a fundamental
human right. Support for human rights and social welfare is found in Arti-
cle 3 of the Declaration of Human Rights. It states "[e]veryone has the
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id.
'3' See id.
132 Varmus, supra note 127.
131 See id.
134 AFRICA NEWS, supra note 20.
2001
162 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 7
right to life, liberty, and security of person. . ."13 Moreover, Article 12 of
the United Nations' Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
lays a proper foundation for sound public health policy with respect to intel-
lectual property rights. The covenant includes the right of everyone to the
"enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health."13 6
Although the United States is not a signatory to Article 12, the
United States traditionally has lobbied foreign governments to adhere to
principles upholding "human rights." In fact, the United States has levied
sanctions against countries it deems guilty of human rights abuses. 37
Proposals:
Given the seeming inconsistency of foreign and trade policies, the
U.S. should reconsider its approach toward other countries pursuing WTO
legal policies, such as compulsory licensing and parallel trade. These coun-
tries include, but are not limited to Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, India, and
Israel. The U.S. should lift all enacted sanctions against countries in direct
retaliation for pursuing any intellectual property policies aimed at address-
ing urgent public health needs, such as those associated with HIV/AIDS.
The U.S. should recognize that creating wide powers for granting compul-
sory licenses is not in contradiction of TRIPS-WTO.138 It is actually a com-
ponent of the United States domestic laws.139
SUMMARY
This article examined South Africa's challenge in combating its
growing HIV/AIDS epidemic. In passing SAMMDRA 15(c), the South Af-
rican government protected its right to institute parallel trade and compul-
135 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 3), G.A. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
136 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S.
3, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1976).
137 Past and current economic embargoes by the United States include but are not
limited to Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Nicaragua, all under claims which include allega-
tions of human rights abuses.
138 Annex IC to the Final Act and Agreement Establishing World Trade Organiza-
tion, Dec. 15, 1993, (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81; See also The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts (Geneva: GAT Secre-
tariat, 1994).
139 Nader et. al., supra note 118; see also, supra note 16.
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sory licenses. The government aimed to provide wider access to drugs,
most of which combat HIV/AIDS.
The United States, acting as an agent of multinational pharmaceuti-
cals, sought to retain profits and protect patent rights. Both bodies pres-
sured South Africa to change its laws. After sustained worldwide efforts
among consumer interest and public health advocates, the United States
government relented and changed its position on SAMMDRA 15(c). South
Africa has followed suit by altering SAMMDRA 15 (c) to more closely
resemble Articles in GATT. Nonetheless, the South African policy was
already legal under TRIPS and proved to usher in large-scale health benefits
through cheaper and wider access to essential drugs.
Since the policy shift of the United States, South Africa has been
reevaluating its own public health strategy in a seemingly quixotic manner.
However, it at least seems it is free to do so without outside pressure. More-
over, South Africa has also sought to deliver Diflucan; an HIV/AIDS re-
lated treatment, free of charge to AIDS patients.140 Given that South Africa
prevailed in preserving its compulsory licensing and parallel imports, the
same case could be made with other countries in desiring access to cheaper
drugs.
Parallel imports and compulsory licenses in the developing world
do not affect companies' revenues significantly. However, public health
benefits are enormous. For the protection of fundamental human rights, the
U.S. should reconsider its global trade polices of essential pharmaceuticals
and implement strategies that place public health concerns "paramount" to
intellectual property issues.
140 Pfizer plans to give fluconazole free to South African AIDS Patients,
MARKETLEr-rER, Apr. 10, 2000. (Where Pfizer sent a letter to the Treatment Action
Campaign in South Africa that an "appropriate response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic
must be made with consideration for safe, ethical treatment, in full coordination
with the South African government, and through appropriate medical
infrastructure.").
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